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Obligation of the Parties, Lawyers and Judges
Sandor Udvary*
Abstract. The author analyses the newly codified civil procedure regarding its overall position towards the 
distribution of the obligations between the parties, their lawyers and the judges. Every civil procedure is balanced 
on the axis of this distribution, changing their inquisitorial or adversarial nature as the obligations vary. As the 
author illuminates, the new Code strikes a delicate balance between the elevated responsibilities of the parties and 
particularly their lawyers, and on the other side the courts having the burden of adjudicating a case in a fair and 
just way within reasonable time. 
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1. THE CODIFICATION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The “obligation” of the author is to present the newly codified Hungarian Code of Civil 
Procedure from the viewpoint of the rights and duties of the parties, lawyers and judges. 
Professor Uzelac gave a very interesting presentation about their results at the European 
Law Institute,1 whereas this paper describes the forthcoming Code. The Hungarian Code 
was under public and administrative debate at the time of the presentation and after a 
parliamentary debate and several amendments there it was passed into law: Act CXXX of 
2016. Some critics would say that this upcoming Code is ready for breaking. It will be 
known in an instant, because unlike substantive law, which needs years to develop and, 
even then, may be bent by interpretation, procedural law will show its errors and flaws in 
minutes, sometimes literally, after entering force and have space for interpretative amends. 
Thus, the author can only hope that this piece of legislation is good enough and not flawed 
beyond repair.
In general terms, the obligation of parties, lawyers and judges need to be balanced. 
Since Franz Klein and his concept of social function of civil procedure,2 it is rarely stated 
on a theoretical level that any state might want to return to the liberal traditions of the civil 
procedure. However, in Hungary there was a dreadful experience with the centralized 
experiment of civil procedure.3 The neighbouring state: Austria, which is close to our legal 
tradition might show a good middle stance – aurea mediocritas. Furthermore, there are 
constitutional and international requirements, most of them not present a century ago, which 
narrow the path of any legislator. These constitutional guarantees stem from international 
agreements or internal tradition. These regulate fundamental procedural safeguards and are 
indispensable to a modern procedural system as framework in a globalizing world; where 
       *  Associate professor, Károli University, School of Law, head of the Civil Procedure Department, 
udvary.sandor@kre.hu
1 Conference on the New Hungarian Civil Procedure Act and the Development of European 
Rules of Civil Procedure, European Law Institute – UNIDROIT Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Institute for Legal Studies – Hungarian Ministry of Justice – National Office for the Judiciary 30–31 
May, 2016, Budapest <https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Events/HU_
UNIDROIT_AGENDA.pdf> accessed 6 June 2017.
2 Klein (1891), on his impact on continental civil procedure, see: Walter (2008) 101–10.
3 Gyekiczky (2003); Gyekiczky (2006); Gyekiczky (2016).
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these guarantees (access to justice, equality of rights, fair and public hearing etc.) serve the 
citizens and companies as safety net. International standards given by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the ever growing EU law and its constantly evolving 
interpretations would effectively prevent a returning to old totalitarian ways of rendering 
civil justice. These regulations and rules effectively narrow the path of the legislator to 
renew any Code to a theoretically appealing fashion – if that solution would practically 
violate any internationally recognized or constitutional right. An example from the 
economic analysis point of view is that the judicial system, a constitutional institution, does 
not need to be profitable and might be overburdened by small cases which are too small for 
the invested public money into the working hour of a judge. Still, legislator might not 
exclude judicial remedy under, say 1 million HUF (3300 USD), or 3 million HUF (10750 
USD) but has to find other ways. Legislator resolved this by the concept of small claims 
procedure. Professor Varga criticized this idea as it breaks the required unity of the Code4 
and coupled it with the mandatory order for payment issued by the civil law notary. Perhaps 
the system will soon change and the small claims procedure will be dropped – in accordance 
with Prof. Németh’s and Varga’s concept of all the most unified tracks of civil justices,5 
which was accepted by the new Code. The important lesson is that there is a way to find a 
solution for the legislative aim to lessen the burdens of judicial system from small claims 
litigation.
2. SEVERAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE COURTS UNDER THE NEW CODE
2.1. This article focuses on a strict description of the renewed Code and focus starts with 
the judge and their obligations during the procedure.
According to §4 of the original draft and §3 of the T/11900 Bill and the final Code,6 the 
court and the parties must endeavor that all factual circumstances and evidence be present 
in such timely manner that the controversy be tried in possibly one session of the court. 
This principle, a fundamental obligation, of trial-concentration binds the court and the 
parties. This is unfolded in particular regulations of offering the evidence, the form of 
claim, the restrictions in amending the claims etc. However, as the principles provide an 
interpretative framework for the particular rules, they all have to be interpreted in 
accordance with this principle. Thus when procedural circumstances would allow final 
decision in one session but the judge fails to decide seems to be a violation of that principle. 
There are not much about sanctions in the Civil Procedure, but the Act on the Judges Status 
and their Remuneration indirectly covers the sanctions for constant unlawful activities of 
the judge.
There is still one novelty in the principal chapter of the Code. According to §6 in 
the Bill (§7 in the former draft, the text unchanged), the court, in order to enforce the 
concentration of the litigation, by means and tools set out in this Act shall contribute that 
the parties fulfill their procedural obligations. It is known as “substantive management of 
trial” and the idea initially triggered some resistance amongst the judges. Again, it can be 
seen that the court and the parties hold hand in that obligation. Interestingly, it is not the 
4 Varga (2008) 9–14.
5 Varga (2014) 19–49, 36–41.
6 <http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/11900/11900.pdf> accessed 6 June 2017.
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court’s obligation, mentioned directly in this phrase, but the court’s assistance that helps to 
enable the parties to fulfill their obligation. This phrasing is slightly confusing as it is clear 
that this is a full-fledged obligation on the judicial side and as the first mentioned principle, 
it will also be unfolded in particular rules.
Two more general rules of the first draft (not principles) deserve closer attention. The 
equality of arms (§12)7 was forged in the criminal procedure but Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation related this to civil procedure as well. The court is obligated to let the parties 
know every evidence, plea and petition and make a statement regarding to them. It is rather 
the natural consequence of the contradiction principle, which is so inherent, that it is never 
mentioned, that the opposing parties be entitled to refer to each other’s position.8 This is 
now an expressis verbis obligation of the court strengthen procedural fairness.
Information duty is the last general obligation of the court. This is no real novum, as it 
is in the effective code – the court must inform the unrepresented party about their 
procedural rights and obligations and the possibility of state-financed legal representation 
(§14 of the Draft, rephrased in §111 of the Bill and the Act).
2.2. Rules will not be mentioned in detail which confer the obligation of ex officio 
observation and action to the court, such as finding the lack of their subject-matter 
jurisdiction or that the territorial jurisdiction is lacking. They were known regarding 
the jurisdiction, the status of the parties and their proper representation, the costs of the 
procedure, forged documentary evidence, all of which factors may and must be observed 
ex officio and proper action be taken by the court. There is a slight increase in the number of 
occasions of ex officio actions, partially the result of the EU legislation and court decisions. 
The relevant EU legislation is the consumer-protection rules, which are interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice in a way that ‘The national court is required to examine, of its 
own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and 
factual elements necessary for that task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must 
not apply it, except if the consumer opposes that non-application. That duty is also 
incumbent on the national court when it is ascertaining its own territorial jurisdiction.’9 This 
is only the obligation of the courts in consumer cases but this interpretation reaches well 
beyond the traditional ex officio examination of the territorial jurisdiction as it contains the 
examination of a substantive contractual term.
There is one field where the duties of the court have been eased. The current rules 
mandate the court to decide over the procedural costs ex officio. According the draft of the 
new Code (§§89–90), and similarly in the Bill and the Act (§§80–81), the party may move 
for the reimbursement of their costs by way of statement of expenses and the court must 
decide only if such statement was filed and within its boundaries. According to expectations, 
that will substantively ease the procedural burden on the courts – putting the job of 
calculating and verifying the costs to the shoulder of the parties and their lawyers.
7 Caveat! After the presentation, the T/11900 Bill dropped this explicit rule, but rephrased its 
content in §§110–112. Therefore we keep this argumentation in the Article, with this caveat. 
8 We see that position confirmed in the fact that the legislator later rephrased these regulations 
into the particular rules of the procedure (§§110–112 of the Bill) and left the principal requirement to 
where it belongs: the jurisprudence. 
9 Pannon GSM v Sustikné Győrfi Erzsébet, Case C243/08.
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3. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
3.1. Parties’ rights and obligations will also be slightly amended in the new Code. First of 
all, recalling that the principal rules contained joint obligations for the court and the parties, 
parties have a responsibility to support the procedure when the court is required to ensure 
several procedural rights. Hence, the Courts and parties have the joint obligation of trial-
concentration and the substantive trial management, where the division of responsibility 
remains to be determined by the proceeding courts in the future. Further principles binding 
the parties are the principle of supporting the procedure and the obligation of veracity. 
It simply states that the parties are obligated to support the concentrated procedure. This is 
aimed at the defendant for the majority of cases as it is in their interest to delay the case, but 
sometimes these roles might change (not only in the case of a counter-claim) and this 
principle also binds the plaintiff. The obligation of veracity (§4 of the Bill) binds the parties 
– they have to present their factual allegations and any references to the facts in accordance 
with the truth. However, the legal representative, is not bound by this principle and this will 
be returned to later on. The principle of bona fidei procedure not only binds the parties but 
all procedural actors (representatives, witnesses, experts) and while its content is not 
extracted, the violation of this principle shall be a fine and the awarding of related costs. 
The courts, relying to their present interpretation, carve out the content of this principle.
§10 of the draft (§4 of the Bill in the same way) is the last but perhaps most important 
fundamental “obligation” of the parties. It states that it is the burden of the parties to 
produce the relevant facts and the supporting evidence. The principle of producing the 
relevant material of the case is different from the extreme adversarial principle, as there are 
several exemptions given by law, where the court may order taking evidence on her own 
motion. This is far from the socialist tradition of full-fledged ex officio substantiation and as 
a theoretical remark, it is no burden or obligation of the parties, rather their interest to 
produce the material, as a certain Ferenc Kobler clarified10 over 100 years ago and Tamás 
Éless resurfaced this right before the start of the codification.11
The most important obligation of the parties is related to the procedural steps to be 
taken. The structure of the procedure has to be created sequentially, like bricks are laid on 
one another, and the obligations of the parties are the coupling between these steps. After 
the claim having been filed, the defendant is obligated, rather interested, to answer this 
claim. The rules of this answer are important details, and but the next step in the procedure 
is the option between answering or failing to answer and in the latter case the further 
consequences and sanctions of the default. Now these steps define the procedure and even 
though they might be placed into several structural framework (for example unified or split 
system of trial), the fundamental pattern is surprisingly constant: allegations on plaintiff 
side, answer from the defendant, allegations again and denial of the answer from the right, 
new answers from the left… This pattern could continue on indefinitely but the constitutional 
and practical necessity of rendering a final decision should break the loop at the point of 
‘maturity for decision on the merit’. Naturally the choices of the legislator define the form 
of these actions, that they may be taken orally or must be written (electronic communication), 
that some may be taken during the whole procedure, others will be waived if a certain 
deadline is missed and so on. Still, look backwards to the past, it can be seen that while the 
building of the actual procedure surely has changed, the bricks are still quite the same.
10 Köbler (1901).
11 Éless (2013) 613–16. 
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3.2. How is that building shaped in the new Code? As a reminder, discussions of the 
procedure of the general first instance court, the Regional Court (while for the cases of local 
courts, these requirements are eased to some extent. First of all, written part of the procedure 
is somewhat strengthened, since claim and answer must be filed with the court in writing. 
This has to be coupled with the general rule of mandatory legal representation and the 
obligation of lawyers to communicate with the court in electronic ways. The following 
picture appears where there is at least one round of document exchange of the parties, 
where they have to meet strict formal requirements set out in the code and they have to do 
it in electronic way. The strict formal requirements requires the statement of claim to be 
divided into introductory part with the court and the personal information on the parties in 
it; a substantive part, where the definite claim must be stated with great accuracy. The factual 
basis of the case must be stated along with the legal background of the stated claim and 
all the aforementioned factors must be supported by the relevant documentary evidence, or 
the offering of the necessary evidence. The closing part should contain data related to 
the jurisdiction of the court, the capacity of the parties, the representation, the fees etc. 
and there are several appendices that must be attached to the claim. The answer of the 
defendant – which again must be submitted in a written form – must contain relevant 
defense in the corresponding order.
After this round of document exchange, the court shall decide whether a preparatory 
trial needs to be held or another round of document exchange is necessary. The court must 
hold a preparatory trial if it any of the parties have move for it.
3.3. The most onerous burden of the parties shall be the complete statement of facts 
and legal background of the claim together with the production of evidence. Virtually all 
experts have agreed that split system of trial, and the obligation of the parties to fix the 
boundaries of their controversy must be so regulated that the trial on the merit should deal 
with the evidence and legal issues of the case and no amendment, modification of pleading 
be allowed during that second phase.12
Where honest difference between professional opinions occurs is the structure of 
preparatory trial and the scope of parties’ obligation thereof. The experts’ commission from 
the Minister of Justice found that, besides pleading in written form, the oral preparatory 
trial should take place in quick succession, where the defendant would be obligated to 
present their defenses, procedural objections first, so the court could examine the rejection 
of the claim. During this preparatory trial, with the active participation of the judge, both 
parties would fix the boundaries of the trial, which then could turn into the meritorious 
issues. Claims and substantive defenses could not be amendable later. During the trial, the 
parties, on merit, would be allowed and obligated to propose and present their evidence and 
necessary legal reasoning, besides their original reasons presented in their claims and 
substantive defenses.13 Thus, the experts commission found little place for preclusion, only 
during the trial on the merits the timely fashion of the procedure would allow for exclusion 
of delayed evidence.
The draft earlier under administrative debate has taken another course, with the clear 
concurrence of the judicial branch and has somewhat backed down. The Bill now contains 
eased rules. The first draft of the Code contained an explicit obligation of the parties to state 
all necessary facts and propose their evidence in their claims and defenses during the 
12 See: Éless and Döme (2014) 50–78.
13 Éless and Döme (2014) 50–78.
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preparatory trial. A categorical rule declared any fact stated or evidence proposed later, after 
the preparatory stage to be null and void. That was categorical preclusion that, according to 
the expectations,  would serve the timely administration of justice. However, there is a rule 
in the draft, which allows stating new facts or proposing new evidence only under certain 
circumstances, essentially in the case of permissible amendment of pleading (§227 of the 
Draft on Subsequent Production of Evidence). All these three parts effectively curtailed 
presentation of factual elements to the preparatory stage, thus leaving the trials on the merit 
only with the taking of that evidence and deliver a decision based on that.
However, due to internal and external critiques, the categorical rule to declare any later 
proposed fact and evidence null and void, has been dropped and the Bill of the Code 
contains no such rule. Thus, now the parties have the obligation of presenting their facts 
and evidence in their claim and defenses to the possible extent – that is a clear remaining 
obligation on their side. Still, the narrow rule of allowing statement of facts and evidence in 
the second (meritorious) phase, stands. The explicit preclusionary rule has been dropped.
3.4. The author would like to take a moment from the narrative of the rules and offer 
an interpretation with a suggestion. The author was a strong supporter of preclusion inserted 
into the Code, as a disciplined procedure needs such sanctions where the delay or failure to 
present facts and evidence results in decision based on the existing data. The author had 
always suggested that the rules be flexible enough to avoid unwanted consequences. It was 
suggested that an escape route should be incorporated into the meritorious phase so that the 
party be allowed to present fact or evidence if they show that there is no fault on their side 
to present this in the earlier phase e.g., the fact and its evidence was unknown to them and 
even with exercising due diligence they could not have known the fact, offered or presented 
that evidence. Of course with that exception, a possible delay has been created in the whole 
procedure, but when justice so requires, the Code should allow the presentation of evidence.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYERS
4.1. Lawyers as professional representative of the parties are the usual, though not 
indispensable, part of the procedure. It is no coincidence that the mandatory representation 
was considered constitutional by the Constitutional Court as it improves the quality of the 
administration of justice, in general.14 Thus, the Code tries to clarify the somewhat blurred 
picture of mandatory representation – it shall be the main rule, with the exception of the 
cases of local courts as first instance courts. Thus, in cases brought before the local courts 
and during their appellate procedure, the party should be free, not be obligated, to mandate 
professional representative. The personal scope of mandatory representation will also be 
narrowed. Only attorneys-at-law shall have license to represent before the courts, with the 
minor exception of persons with bar exam in their own cases or the public prosecutor. Thus 
might bar the now representing in-house-counsels out of the court, which might overburden 
the Bar Associations. A relevant portion of the cases initiated by or against administrative 
agencies or companies are legally represented by the in-house-counsels (with a bar exam – 
the same qualification as attorneys) and it is unclear, how the attorneys shall take over these 
tasks. The Legal Department of Treasury (Kincstári Jogügyi Igazgatóság) should ease the 
problem as all state-agencies will be represented by this entity, but companies’ attorneys 
may still pose a practical problem. Modifications in the overall picture of legal professions 
14 Udvary (2003) 328–45. 
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since conference15 has affected this picture. According to the present concept of the 
legislator, in-house-counsels who provide services of representation before the court (of 
their employee) shall be obligated to join the Bar Association as employed attorneys. Thus, 
the limitation of representation to attorneys shall not have a dramatic effect on the legal 
profession.
4.2. The Code will broaden the scope of mandatory representation and there will be 
exception, changing the current rule. Is there any elevated requirement against lawyers? 
First of all, the burdens on the parties shall be conveyed to the shoulders of the lawyer, 
through a contract for legal services, which the lawyer is free to undertake. Still, if accepted, 
they are professionally liable, with the threat of monetary compensation, for doing all 
necessary procedural actions in the best interest of the party. Professional liability is not 
aggravated, though the obligations to carry out are more numerous and on more occasions 
have strict deadline.
4.3. One more general remark is that the level of orality in the procedure has dropped 
somewhat, so the level of written communication, especially the electronic communication 
will be increased. E-litigation is coming, with delays, and this communication method is 
written (with the exception of CCTV trial). It needs tools and proficiency, that the ordinary 
clients do not have, and it is mandatory for the legal representatives and companies. As 
legal representation is mandatory in general, the normal ways of communication seems to 
be exceptional rather than the rule. The statistics still show that vast number of cases should 
start before the local court, where neither legal representation, nor e-communication is 
mandatory. However, the aim of the legislator is to strongly promote this supposedly fast 
method of communication. It will necessitate all efforts on the lawyers’ society’s side to 
live up to the expectations and make good use of these technologies.
The exact reason for mentioning this is the very strict sanction of failing to meet the 
requirements. Should e-communication be mandatory or freely undertaken by the party, the 
failure to send any submission, motion to the court in the proper form would be sanctioned 
by nullity. If the party (or their lawyer) fails to send any submission to the court in electronic 
means, or by sending it so, fails to meet the particular many technical requirements, the 
submission must be deemed null and void and the party and his representative is in default. 
Naturally, it can be understood that no system may be made exclusive, if its use may be 
freely evaded. It is a simple necessity that the mandatory use of the system be sanctioned. 
However, besides the possible rise in the numbers of professional liability cases against the 
lawyers, the courts will face a situation, where they will hold a document in their hand, null 
and void by the force of the law owing to the possible technical failings of the lawyer, but 
the document would facilitate justice. Clearly, they have to ignore it by the direct order of 
the law, just as Antigone should have ignored the divine order and leave his brother 
unburied. Of course, there is no intention to foresee such tragedies, but the collision of 
ethical and legal regulations might occur in such cases. The law has to prevail.
4.4. It has to be admitted that not all lawyers bear the qualities of a Greek hero of a 
tragedy but they need to be sanctioned and disciplined. For that, the draft of the Code 
reserves the sanction of mala fidei behavior of the representative. Thus, if the lawyer 
violates their duty of veracity, they wantonly or neglectfully tells untrue or denies true fact, 
refers to manifestly unfounded evidence or untruly refers to facts, they have to be fined, if 
the act was their fault. Now, that is nothing but reservation of the former mala fidei 
15 As in note 1.
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procedural act, renamed to the violation of veracity. Still, the underlying theory has changed, 
while the general prohibition of mala fidei procedural acts remained, but without particular 
examples. The judicial practice will tell its content. This theoretical change might be 
problematic from one point, though, if unamended. It has been seen that the obligation of 
veracity binds the parties exclusively. Here, the violation of this principle is sanctioned 
when the party or their representative commits the act. Thus, the personal scope of the 
underlying principle, of which’s violation is to be sanctioned does not cover the 
representative. If court interpretation may not jump this gap over, the author is rather sure 
that the legislator will have to amend the rule, for the aim of disciplining liar lawyers (Is it 
a coincidence how similar the two words sound?) is legitimate on the side of the lawmaker. 
Neither those lawyers deserve protection, who lie by mandate from the party. If the legal 
representative reflects the allegations of their client, they will have to defend themselves 
with regular attorney practices. Unethical elements should be weeded out of the bar 
association.
To summarize this paper, the obligations of the parties, their lawyers and the courts 
have been reshaped by the changes in the structure of the procedure and the intensified 
written form. Practice will show whether the stricter rules will support the timely resolution 
of controversies, or be counterproductive, as some honest critiques state. For the sake of the 
law abiding citizens, it can only be hoped that the civil justice system will apply these rules 
to further the constitutional goals and guarantees of the citizens, for their constant well-
being.
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